Dilemmas of political legitimacy in the European Union: a contractarian analysis by Weale, A
  
1 
Submitted Version: For Authoritative Version See: https://www-tandfonline-
com.libproxy.ucl.ac.uk/doi/full/10.1080/23745118.2016.1231453 
 




1. From Eurocrisis to Legitimacy Crisis 
 
At one time the Lisbon Treaty was thought to mark an end to disputes about the political legitimacy of the 
European Union.  When the treaty came into force, there was a widespread hope that the negotiations 
over EU institutional and political reform that had dominated European discussions for over twenty years 
were now at an end.  In the words of one text-book on European Union law 'after nearly a decade of 
complex negotiations and often bitter disputes, the outcome of the constitutional reform process initiated 
at Nice and Laeken is that the TEU and TFEU (as revised by the TL) now provide the fundamental legal 
framework for the institutions and activities of the European Union' (Dashwood et al. 2011: 20).  If the 
first decade of the new millennium had begun with the high, but ultimately failed, hope of establishing a 
democratic and functional constitution for the European Union, it might at least end with a set of working 
institutions enabling the Union to conduct its business in a reasonably efficient and effective way.  Within 
this framework the growing powers of the European Parliament, the increased scrutiny of proposed 
legislation by national parliaments and the potential inherent in the citizens' initiative might all be seen by 
many as democratic elements within the decision making processes.  Moreover, the Commission's 
attempts to improve governance, following its 2001 White Paper, involving greater openness and 
transparency in respect of interest-group representation, provided, according to some, another route for 
enhancing political accountability and responsibility.  Whatever the merits or demerits of particular 
clauses of the Lisbon Treaty, it might have seemed reasonable to hope that the institutional and 
constitutional discussions that had come to dominate the EU since the original 'no' in the Danish 
referendum of June 1992 were now accommodated within a political settlement that would last for a 
generation.  If it had not established the institutions of a fully functioning constitutional democracy, the 
EU should have secured increased political legitimacy. 
 
In the same year that the Treaty of Lisbon was negotiated and agreed, the first signs of the global financial 
and economic crisis began to emerge.  In the United States some sub-prime mortgage underwriters filed 
for bankruptcy and there were downgrades of mortgage-backed securities by credit-rating agencies.  The 
German bank IKB had to be supported by a government-owned development bank because it was 
dependent upon such loans.  Inter-bank lending arrangements broke down and in the UK the Northern 
Rock bank suffered a massive run eventually leading to its take-over by the government.  The need to 
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control credit led to the bursting of the property bubble that had been allowed to develop in such countries 
as Spain and Ireland.  As the depth of loan indebtedness became apparent, a number of private banks 
either required governmental financial bailouts to meet their obligations or had to declare themselves 
bankrupt.  In consequence, the pressures of the crisis shifted to the public finances of the Member States, 
since those states stood as the de facto guarantors of banking liabilities.  To avoid financial panic, private 
liabilities became public obligations.  However, in a number of countries, the state of the public finances 
was such that the governments were not on their own capable of absorbing the spending required.  In 
addition to the banking liabilities transferred to the public purse, some Member States had been under-
recording their government debt over a number of years, whilst other had spent unproductively, so that 
debt and deficit levels were much higher than was required by the Stability and Growth Pact.  A number 
of governments were thus unable to roll over their bond financing.  In the same month in which the 
Lisbon Treaty came into force, the Greek government admitted that its public debt amounted to 113% of 
GDP, compared to the 60% required by the Stability and Growth Pact, and after much negotiation the EU 
agreed to provide up to 110bn Euros in emergency loans to Greece in May 2010.  In November 2010, the 
Irish government secured 85bn Euros worth of loans and in May 2011 the Eurozone countries and the 
IMF provided a 78bn Euro bailout to Portugal.  Spain and Cyprus were to follow.  The financial crisis had 
disrupted the era of institutional and constitutional stability before it had begun. 
 
In response to the financial and economic crisis, the EU and its Member States have had to improvise a 
series of institutional and policy measures in an unprecedented way.  Measures have included the 
strengthening of the Stability and Growth Pact, the creation of the European Semester with the aim of 
coordinating economic and fiscal policy, agreement on the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and 
Governance, as well as the establishment of the European Financial Stability Facility and its successor, 
the European Stability Facility.  EMU II differs substantially from EMU I (Begg 2013), raising issues of a 
political and constitutional character that have engaged a number of national constitutional courts, most 
notably Germany’s Federal Constitutional Court (Federal Constitutional Court 2011, 2014a and 2014b). 
 
The political and policy consequences of the financial crisis have revived and intensified long-standing 
questions about the political legitimacy of the EU.  Prior to the crisis, the relevant arguments in the 
literature involve three distinct claims.  Firstly, there was a normative assumption that rightful political 
authority in the modern world is given solely through democracy.  Associated with this claim was the 
view that party government, by which governments derived their authority through their winning in the 
contest of free and fair elections, was an adequate way to secure democracy.  A second element in the 
critique of the EU's deficit of legitimacy was that the institutions of the EU do not possess the 
characteristic institutional features that would make them democratic in the sense in which the institutions 
of the Member States are democratic, a view nicely expressed in the familiar observation that, if the EU 
itself applied to join the EU, it would be rejected as being insufficiently democratic.  Thirdly, it was 
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argued that the operation of the EU threatened the democratic operation of political institutions within the 
Member States, not only in respect of their constitutional powers but also in respect of their ability to 
engage in ‘the authoritative allocations of values’ (Easton 1953: 129-34) that yields fair and socially 
acceptable solutions to problems of public policy (for a good summary of these arguments, see Goodhart 
2007). 
 
To say that there are serious issues of political legitimacy within the EU is not to say that all that all 
claims by the EU are illegitimate.  Indeed, in some ways, the most striking feature of the powers and 
responsibilities that have accumulated under the acquis communautaire has been their general acceptance.  
Over a number of years, the EU has successfully set standards for occupational health and safety, 
environmental protection, and non-discrimination in employment.  It has made and enforced competition 
policy.  It negotiates with the WTO and other international bodies on behalf of Member States and EU 
citizens.  It promotes regional development, educational exchange and the arts.  It provides agricultural 
support and sets fishing quotas.  It has a peace-keeping force.  In short, it does many things that its 
Member States have undertaken, sometimes in addition to those Member States, sometimes jointly with 
them, and at other times instead of them.  The claim of the EU to political authority is not merely formal 
but has real world effects, not least because the EU’s right to make certain sorts of rules and pursue its 
policies is generally accepted by Member States and their citizens.  The EU successfully secures revenue 
to finance its expenditure, and has never been threatened by bankruptcy as some states have been.  When 
there are disputes about the legitimate authority of the EU or its institutions, say in relation to the relative 
roles of the Commission and the Council, there are accepted methods of resolving those disagreements 
and the parties to the dispute accept the resolution.  If political legitimacy requires a minimum degree of 
acceptance and compliance by key actors over whom legitimate authority is claimed, then the EU has that 
legitimacy.   
 
Yet, even allowing for this qualification, the crisis of the eurozone has raised profound questions about 
the political legitimacy of the EU.  Economic and monetary union has been central to the dynamic of 
European integration, but it requires a fundamental transfer of political authority from the level of the 
Member States to the level of Europe.  Since, among the central functions of the state in the modern era 
has been the right to be the monopoly supplier of money, agreeing to monetary union means that Member 
States were ceding political authority of a major kind.  If the eurozone crisis has prompted a crisis of 
political legitimacy for the EU, how are we to understand what this involves and the conditions under 
which the crisis can be resolved?  Legitimacy is rightful authority.  It is a claim not just about the de facto 
ability to make and enforce rules but also about the right to make and enforce rules.  To say that an agent 
has de facto power is to say that their rules are generally acceptable.  To say that an agent has rightful 
power is to say that the rules they make are acceptable from a normative point of view.  In any viable and 
continuing system of political authority, it is typically only necessary to understand the extent to which 
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rule-making authority is accepted, since stable political systems rest on a basis of authority that is broadly 
acceptable.  However, in times of crisis, it is necessary to link political authority to normative principles 
of political legitimacy, to show how those subject to authoritative rule-making have good reason to accept 
the obligations that the rules imply.  
 
The purpose of this paper is to offer a normative analysis of the problem of political legitimacy in the EU.  
To this end, it uses contractarian political theory.  According to contractarian theory, political authority is 
to be understood as stemming from a contract agreed, either explicitly or implicitly, among political 
agents, the contract defining the terms and conditions of their association (Buchanan and Tullock 1963; 
Gauthier 1986; Ostrom 1990).  Contractarian theory is a useful intellectual construct by which to 
understand the EU, because the EU itself can be thought of as a compound polity (Fabbrini 2007).  A 
compound polity is a union of states joined together in their capacity as representatives of their peoples.  
In such a polity, political authority is dispersed horizontally, among differing governing institutions, and 
vertically, among different levels of governance.  To create a compound polity requires states to join with 
one another on the basis of their being able to make credible commitments to one another about their 
complying with the terms of the inter-state contract.  However, it also requires those same states to make 
their commitments in representative capacity.  Representation means more than authorisation; it also 
entails the ability of those states to embody the collective will of their peoples in a way that retains what 
Rawls (1999) called the ‘fair value of political liberties’.  The problem of the EU’s political legitimacy is 
then the securing of that legitimacy at two levels: the level at which states interact with one another and 
the level at which states interact with their peoples. 
 
Because the problem of two-level legitimacy is a problem of securing credible commitment among the 
Member States at the international level, whilst at the same time ensuring that the commitment is 
acceptable at the domestic level, the legitimacy demands of the EU can be constructed as a normative 
two-level game (Savage and Weale 2009).  Understanding the development of the EU as a two-level 
game has been a feature of inter-governmentalist accounts of European integration and the model has also 
been applied to international agreements more generally.  However, these analyses have been empirical, 
using the concept of a two-level game as an heuristic device to determine why some international 
agreements are accepted and others fail, by showing that acceptance requires that any putative 
international agreement be in the win-set of the status quo for all those – domestic actors as well as 
international partners - who are veto-players in the game.  The theory of normative two-level legitimacy, 
by contrast, looks beyond what is accepted by players in a two-level game to the reasons that agents have 
for adopting their preferences, evaluating the justifiability of the practical reasoning that leads actors to 
take up whatever positions that they do.  In the case of the EU, such a theory highlights the importance of 





Understood from this normative point of view, the central problem of the political legitimacy of the EU 
arises from the conflict between the principle of inter-state commitment, which in the limit requires the 
irrevocability of the political contract among Member States, and the principle of popular sovereignty, 
which, together with the idea of ‘the fair value of political liberties’ (Rawls 1999: 194-200; Rawls 2001: 
148-50), can at best only justify a delegated authority to supra-state institutions.  
 
 
2. Contractarian Political Legitimacy in the EU 
 
The European Union rests upon a political contract among its Member States as the representatives of 
their peoples.  The EU has developed through the 'grand bargains' (Moravcsik 1998) incorporated in the 
successive treaties beginning in the Paris Treaty of 1951 and culminating (to date) in the Lisbon Treaty of 
2007.  Various accounts have been offered for the motives of the Member States entering into these 
treaties, but the two dominant explanations in the literature refer either to the economic interests of the 
key actors – at least as understood by political elites and the political coalitions that influenced them – or 
the idealism of a generation of politicians intent on ending the legacy of war in Europe.  Whatever the 
precise balance of explanation between these competing accounts, a large number of countries found it 
advantageous to participate in the political project that has become the European Union.  If we think of 
the process as a political contract, then the treaties and the acquis communautaire define that contracts 
terms and content.  
 
As a lawful political regime exercising the political authority derived from the contractual association of 
the treaties, the EU claims political legitimacy.  Since the political contract on which it rests is among 
governments as political representatives of peoples, the legitimacy of the EU has to be secured at two 
levels.  It must be secured at the European level among the Member States who are parties to a political 
contract in which they recognise the rights and obligations each is taking on under the contract.  It must 
also be secured at the domestic level through the processes by which governments explain and justify to 
citizens and the institutions of constitutional control why the European political contract is worthy of 
support and therefore why it should be ratified and supported either by parliament or by the people.  Any 
European political contract has to satisfy simultaneously these twin requirements of the inter-
governmental legitimacy of credible commitment of states to one another and the domestic legitimacy of 
governments accountable to their populations. 
 
At the inter-state level, the parties to the contract have to make commitments to one another forming the 
basis for their agreement to mutual advantage.  Historically, within the EU, these commitments have 
primarily concerned the removal of barriers to trade, environmental and social policy measures and, most 
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importantly, monetary union with its associated budgetary disciplines in the Stability and Growth Pact.  A 
political contract defines the terms and conditions under which the parties are willing to cooperate with 
one another.  In this sense the obligations of the parties to the contract are contingent upon the 
performance of the parties.  The parties to a political contract are contingent compliers.  This can be 
understood in both a positive and a negative sense.  If one has entered a contract committing oneself to a 
particular course of action provided that others perform their part, then there is an obligation to play one's 
part.  Conversely, if others do not perform their part then the obligation of compliance falls.  
Understanding this contingent compliance of an inter-state political contract is illuminated by considering 
the logic of contractual association as defined by social contract theory, particularly in the version 
developed by Gauthier (1986).  
 
Firstly, according to modern social contract theory, a successful social contract represents an agreement 
relative to a baseline point of non-agreement.  Such a point of non-agreement yields to each potential 
party to the contract the best that they can secure in the absence of agreement.  In the traditional versions 
of contract theory to be found in Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau, this point of non-agreement is identified 
with a 'state of nature', that is to say a state of society without government.  However, the baseline point 
of non-agreement does not have to be thought of in that way.  For example, the idea of a baseline point of 
non-agreement can be applied in the context of resource conservation in which the non-agreement point 
would be a situation in which those using resources, for example grazing stock or fishing, have no 
common rule that constrains their appropriation of the resource.  Each agent appropriating natural 
resources may allow others freedom to appropriate, but none accept any common rule to which all should 
conform (Ostrom, 1990; Weale, 2013).  Analogously, in the context of international relations, the non-
agreement point may sometimes be a state of war or latent hostility, akin to the Hobbesian state of nature, 
but equally it could a state in which, whilst there was no aggression among nations, there was no 
cooperation on such matters as safety standards for products or the control of cross-border diseases.  The 
key idea of social contract theory is the need for agreed rules to enable actors to move beyond the 
baseline point.  
 
Secondly, in order for there to be scope for negotiation over the terms of a social contract, the baseline 
non-agreement point has to be sub-optimal from the point of view of the agents involved.  If there is no 
possibility for improvement in the well-being or interests of the agents by adopting a set of rules within a 
social contract, then there is nothing to agree about to mutual advantage.  A social contract would have no 
point.  By acting together all agents can do better than if each agent acted independently.  The fact of 
disadvantage at the point of non-agreement is not sufficient to create the conditions for a contract.  There 
also has to be the possibility of improvement.  Note that the possibility of everyone gaining does not 
imply that the baseline point of non-agreement is an out-of-equilibrium point.  Equilibrium in this sense 
means that each player is making the best move that he or she can given the moves of the other players.  
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As the well-known example of the Prisoners' Dilemma game shows, players may be locked into a sub-
optimal equilibrium (Ordeshook 1986: 206-10) 
 
Thirdly, a distinctive feature of the social contract approach is that the improvement has to be from the 
point of view of each participant (Gauthier 1979).  A social contract cannot rest upon the claim that the 
majority, even the vast majority, of agents would be better off were some rule to be adopted, if this means 
that some agents, even a small minority, have to carry uncompensated costs in order for that benefit to be 
secured.  Thus, it is not simply that some agents can improve their situation over the baseline situation of 
non-agreement; it is also that each agent can improve his or her situation only provided that others can do 
so as well.  This does not mean that once a rule is agreed within a social contract it will always be to the 
advantage of an agent to follow that rule.  On particular occasions, compliance may well be 
disadvantageous in the particular instance.  The social contract provides rules the general effect of which 
are generally to the advantage of each, although sometimes an agreed rule may be to the disadvantage of 
some.  For example, agents as a group may adopt the rule of majority rule in the making of collective 
decisions, because each person thinks that he or she will be better off if the costs of collective decision 
making are reduced from those that they would be under unanimity.  In particular instances, however, an 
agent may regret that such a rule is in operation.  Thus, on some occasions particular Member States 
operating under the rule of qualified majority voting in the Council of Ministers will find that a rule 
agreed by others will be disadvantageous to themselves.  Nonetheless the all-round gains of the rule being 
in operation mean that it is better to enter into the agreement than not, and of course in the council of 
ministers the rule of seeking as much consensus as possible mitigates any disadvantageous effects the 
qualified majority may have.  The principle is not that every agent should always find it to be 
advantageous to follow the rule, but that each agent should find it advantageous to make an agreement 
with everyone else to follow the rule (Grice 1967: 100). 
 
Fourthly, where there is the possibility of a rule being contrary to an agent's interests on any particular 
occasion, even though the general effect of the rule is advantageous to all, each party must be in a 
position credibly to commit to the agreement. If actors believe that others will not keep their side of the 
bargain, they have no incentive to incur the costs of agreement as the price of securing the gains, since 
they have no assurance that others will not exploit their compliance.  Compliant actors will calculate that 
they will lose the returns they could have gained without cooperation and suffer the disadvantages of 
compliance with a set of rules that others are breaking.  It is sometimes possible that some agreements 
will require only general, and not universal, compliance, some 'small' actors being able to free ride on the 
compliance of others, acting outside the rule with no detrimental effect on the general agreement.  
However, parties to a social contract would more often than not find it imprudent to allow such 
exceptions, and would insist on compliance being universal.  Yet, if there is a threat to the agreement 
  
8 
from the temptation to free ride by any one party, then the credible commitment of all parties is needed in 
order for the agreement to be secured. 
 
Credible commitment in a social contract is a fundamental problem.  For natural persons there are various 
ways of acquiring the capacity of credible commitment.  One device is to develop a reputation as 
someone who is known to keep promises.  A significant line of argument in the literature on social 
contract theory is that one can only reliably develop such a reputation provided that one has genuinely 
acquired a disposition to keep one's promises (Gauthier 1986).  On this line of analysis, credible 
commitment is only possible when one has the disposition to keep one's word and one is known to have 
this disposition, for then, when any one occasion on which one can shirk one's obligations arises, one will 
act on one's disposition rather than according to one's short-term advantage.  It might seem to be irrational 
to keep one's promise when it is to one's own (possibly significant) disadvantage on any one occasion, but 
this consideration can be countered by observing that unless one is known to be the sort of person who 
keeps promises, others will have no reason to entertain the idea of an agreement.  The disposition to keep 
one's word, and the reputation of being someone with this disposition, enables one to have opportunities 
that would not otherwise be available.  Trustworthy states entering into international agreements may 
have more room for manoeuvre in difficult circumstances than states that are thought by others to be 
untrustworthy. 
 
A second way for agents to make a credible commitment to others is to enter into an agreement by which 
they submit themselves to monitoring by other others.  In the context of the European Union this 
possibility is illustrated by the European Semester and its associated disciplines.  However, the 
monitoring of policy performance is inherently difficult and not easily observable.  The assessment of 
performance depends upon the information that is typically supplied by each party, and with some forms 
of public policy there are so many variables affecting performance that it can be impossible to know 
whether fault arises from poor performance or random external disturbance, a feature that has been 
illustrated in the reluctance of the Commission to apply the Excessive Deficits Procedure according to the 
letter. 
 
A third device is to delegate a third-party with the capacity to enforce the agreement.  This is the classic 
Hobbesian technique of endowing a sovereign with sufficient power to keep all agents sufficiently in awe 
that they have an incentive to uphold their commitments in respect of one another.  In effect, creating a 
third-party with this power is a way of changing the incentives that confront agents at the point at which 
they are tempted to break their promise.  At the point at which a promise is costly to comply with, a 
punishment will add a countervailing cost on the other side of the balance sheet, tipping the incentives – if 
the punishment is well-designed – in favour of compliance.  Notice, however, that punishments can be 




Given the constraints of the above conditions, it is necessary that parties can make an ex ante credible 
commitment to a social contract.  It is important that these conditions are met ex ante.  It is not just that 
the agents have a willingness to abide by the terms of the contract.  They also have to be able to commit 
credibly to compliance as a condition for entering into the contract, otherwise the contract will never be 
formed or will exclude those who cannot make the ex ante commitment.  However, there is nothing in the 
logic of social contract theory that says that their contract has to be completely specified in the sense that 
all possible contingencies can be foreseen.  A contract can be ex ante rational for each of the parties if, 
taking into account all the foreseen contingencies, it is still more advantageous to enter the contract than 
not.   
 
What happens when a social contract, presumed to be supported by credible commitments by participants, 
turns out to be broken?  In effect, this was the case with monetary union, where the no bail-out rule of 
Maastricht strengthened by the Stability and Growth Pact, turned out to be unsustainable.  The logic in 
such a situation is either for the agreement to be abandoned, or, if abandonment is very hard, for the 
requirements of monitoring and punishment to be tightened. This is what happened with the rules on 
monetary union, with developments through the European Semester, the Six Pack, the Two Pack and the 
Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in effect employing ever more stringent contractarian 
devices to impose discipline upon participants (Weale 2015).  The strictest form of commitment is an 
irrevocable commitment.  Beyond the initial steps there is no turning back. 
 
Earlier I noted that the political and policy consequences of the financial crisis have intensified long-
standing questions about the political legitimacy of the EU.  In a political culture in which it is assumed 
that rightful political authority is given through the practices of democracy, then institutions of 
governance that are not democratic – and lack the capacity to become democratic – face a serious 
problem of political legitimacy.  If one examines the above logic of credible commitment among states, 
then one can also see that they imply commitments to other states and not to domestic populations.  
Creating systems of monitoring or endowing third-parties with the rights of imposing penalties for non-
compliance are intended to secure agreement from other states.  But each state is a collective actor with 
its own system of political accountability.  Although rational agents need to be able to make credible 
commitments in order to gain the advantages of cooperation, the domestic political accountability of 
collective agents calls into question the extent to which this can be done.  To understand the implications 
of this fact requires us to understand the second level of the two-level normative contract that underlies 







The Domestic Political Contract 
 
Since the actors committing to the contract are Member States, who are irreducibly collective actors, they 
are necessarily involved in a two-level game.  As political representatives they bargain with one another, 
according to the logic of credible commitment outlined in the previous section.  However, they enter such 
bargains in the knowledge that any agreement has to be acceptable to their domestic constituents.  They 
are thus involved in a negotiating relationship with their peers from other states but also in forms of 
accountability and control that are exercised by their domestic constituents.  This two-level feature of the 
EU constitutional contract has two principal effects.  Firstly, it limits the range of bargained outcomes that 
are available to negotiators at the international level.  For any one actor, this does not automatically imply 
that their bargaining position is weakened.  Indeed, since Schelling's (1960) work, it has been realised that 
the 'paradox of weakness' may bestow strength upon negotiators if they can convince others that they are 
subject to a genuine constraint from, say, their domestic constituents.  Nonetheless, if we assume that the 
larger the number of veto-players, the smaller is the win-set of the status quo, then the requirement to 
satisfy the preferences of domestic constituents will impose tighter limits upon feasible moves from the 
non-agreement baseline than would apply were there not the constraint of domestic opinion. 
 
The second principal effect of the two-level structure of the EU's constitutional contract is that it makes it 
more difficult for states to make credible commitments.  Governments negotiating with other 
governments no only have to be able to bind their successors, but they also have to be able to secure 
implementation of matters that have been agreed at the international level.  Thus, even if the negotiators 
have the disposition to commit to the terms of the agreement, they may lack the capacity to do so.  This 
difficulty is highlighted by the fact that any agreement into which a Member State enters not only has to 
be acceptable to domestic constituents, but also has to be known by other states to be acceptable to those 
domestic constituents.  If each must know that every one of the others can make a credible commitment, 
then each must know that all other participants have sufficient domestic legitimacy to ensure that they 
abide by the terms that they have agreed internationally.  The reputational element of international 
legitimacy depends upon satisfying domestic conditions of political legitimacy. 
 
The ability of Member State governments to make credible commitments at the inter-state level thus 
depends upon their being legitimate at the national level.  The Member States negotiate the terms of the 
EU contract as representatives of their peoples.  Representation has several dimensions (Pitkin 1967), 
most obviously ensuring that substantive interests are adequately weighed in the negotiating process.  
However, representation also has a dimension that involves authorisation, and from this point of view the 
most significant thing about representation is that Member States are making commitments on behalf of 
their peoples.  An international treaty normatively binds those who are its parties, and to the extent to 




so in signing an agreement a government is making a commitment on behalf of its citizens.  However, 
such a commitment can only be credible provided that the government making the commitment were seen 
to be the legitimate representative of that body of citizens – otherwise other governments would have no 
reason to find the treaty commitments credible. 
 
How then are we to understand this domestic component of legitimacy?  If we simply take a behavioural 
approach, then we can interpret legitimacy as the settled disposition on the part of members of the 
population to acknowledge the authority of their governments.  If governments enjoy legitimacy in this 
sense, then the task of understanding is simply one of seeing how the preferences of different social 
groups are aggregated to form a collective preference that is then fed into the conduct of international 
negotiations.  For many international agreements such an approach makes sense.  All governments have 
to know is that other governments have an accepted authority, and they can rely upon that accepted 
authority as being the basis of a reliable commitment.  This logic has applied at various times in the 
evolution of the EU.  Thus, it has been argued that the Single European Act and the Treaty on European 
Union reflect the agreed position of national governments whose preferences were in turn shaped by the 
dominant coalitions in domestic politics (Moravcsik (year)).  The two-level game of treaty agreement 
then consists in finding those points in the policy space which, from the viewpoints of the relevant actors, 
are improvements on the status quo.  From this perspective the only role for a theory of legitimacy is to 
provide an account of the framework within which the two stages of preference aggregation take place. 
 
However, such preference-based de facto legitimacy presupposes a stable political context in which 
domestic coalitions do not change quickly, such that an agreement emerging from a balance of preference 
aggregation is likely to reflect the influence of a parallelogram of political forces over the foreseeable 
future.  The ever closer union of the peoples of Europe is in effect the ever closing union of the prevailing 
coalitions of domestic political actors sharing interests across national borders.  In such a situation, the 
process of domestic political ratification and support are likely to be predictable, avoiding a situation in 
which fundamental questions of political legitimacy are raised.  Normative political legitimacy – that is to 
say the reasoned agreement to a set of political institutions – comes to the fore, however, when the 
assumptions of the stable consensus on which domestic support rested are called into question. 
 
 
Normative Legitimacy at the National Level  
 
For some thirty-five years from the Treaty of Rome to the Treaty on European Union, the constraints of 
domestic political accountability on political representatives operating at the international level was 
relatively slight.  Generally speaking the permissive consensus prevailed, and parliaments, peoples and 




folketing after 1973 and the more limited role of the UK's House of Lords Select Committee on the 
European Communities.  Until the Danish 'no' and the French 'petit oui' in 1992, even those countries that 
used referendums did not have problems with treaty changes (as distinct from the problems that some 
governments had with negotiating their terms of entry in the Union).  In terms of courts and the legal 
system, the most striking feature was the positive role of the national courts in expanding the competence 
and scope of the European Court of Justice, as Weiler (reference) has noted. 
 
The domestic consensus across a range of Member States that underlay the extension of EU political 
authority into the field of economic and monetary union rested on a number of elements.  In terms of 
actors, it was made up of a pro-European growth business together with social movements who saw 
advantages to environmental and social protection through reregulation at the EU level.  As Dyson and 
Featherstone (reference) have shown, there was a highly developed policy paradigm justifying closer 
economic union through the free movement of goods, services, capital and labour together with the 
creation of a single currency to reduce transaction costs, to make prices more transparent and to facilitate 
cross-border tendering in public procurement.  This economic paradigm could be supplemented by 
appeals to the benefits of ecological modernisation, according to which the benefits of growth could be 
captured in the form of green technologies.  The legitimacy of this coalition as its associated justificatory 
ideologies was reinforced by continuing support for agriculture (albeit in a reformed version) and a 
willingness to leave the social entitlements of domestic welfare states untouched, except for opening up 
their benefits to non-national EU citizens on a reciprocal basis. 
 
In terms of de facto legitimation, the coalition succeeded as illustrated by the support and seeming 
success of monetary union in its early years.  Normative legitimation takes longer to establish, however, 
as the testing of decision premises under different conditions takes place.  There were always those who 
questioned the plausibility of European economic and monetary union on technical grounds, either 
because they held that the institutional design was poor or that the EU could not constitute an optimal 
currency area (for a useful summary see Bordo and Jonung 2003: 43-4; see also Feldstein 1997).  
Whether the policy developments that have taken place in the wake of the financial crisis – including the 
ECB’s commitment to Outright Monetary Transactions, the moves towards a banking union and the 
requirements on EU states to run regimes of tight fiscal constraint – will resolve these difficulties is for 
time to tell.  What the contractarian theory of EU legitimacy suggests is that any such legitimation must 
provide justificatory expression at the domestic level of Member States as well as at the level of elite 
negotiators.  At present there is little evidence that this is taking place, as the growth of euro-sceptic 






The requirements of two-level legitimacy are easy to state if hard to achieve.  At the international level, 
they require Member States to make their commitments to one another credible by delivering on their 
promises of fiscal discipline.  At the domestic level they require maintenance of the social entitlements of 
the welfare state, which in turns requires dealing with the problem of youth unemployment in many 
countries, most notably the southern EU states.  The experience of economic and monetary union 
suggests that these two requirements will not be met unless decision premises can be tested for their 
plausibility in respect of their empirical assumptions and their acceptability according to the political 
values of domestic electorates.  The construction of institutions to achieve these requirements is still a 
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